Side-Channel Attacks on Human Secrets Vossi Oren, BGU https://iss.oy.ne.ro


SILM Summer School, Rennes (France), July 2019 Joint work with Anatoly Shusterman, Lachlan Kang, Yosef Meltser, Yarden Haskal, Prateek Mittal and Yuval Yarom





https://orenlab.sise.bgu.ac.il


Implementation Attacks




Types of Secrets


Crypto Secrets	State Secrets	Human Secrets
Short-Term	Addresses of Sensitive	Identity
Session Keys	Instructions	Passwords
Long-Term	Inventory of Installed	Browsing History
Signing Keys	Vulnerable Software	Images on Screen
Long-Term	Random Number	Health Sensors
Decryption Keys	Generator State	ricalti Jensois

- What if the secret is compromised?
- How do we protect the secret from attack?



Credit: SF Public Library courtesy of Golden Gate NRA, Park Archives, Interpretive Negative Collection, GOGA-2316





Website Fingerprinting

Automated Website Fingerprinting through Deep Learning Vera Rimmer^{*}, Davy Preuveneers^{*}, Marc Juarez[§], Tom Van Goethem^{*} and Wouter Joosen^{*} simec-COSIC, ESAT, KU Leuven never the origin and destination of a communication at the Email: marc.juarez@esat.kuleuven.be never me ongui anu desunation of a communication at me same time. Tor's architecture thus prevents ISPs and local same ume. for s arcmecture mus prevents 151's and loca network observers from identifying the websites users visit. Network observers from identifying the websites users visit. As a result of previous research on Tor privacy, a serious As a result of previous research on 10t privacy, a serious side-channel of Tor network traffic was revealed that allowed succulation of for network traine was revealed that allowed a local adversary to infer which websites were visited by a Abstract-Several studies have shown that the network traffic Abstract—Several studies have shown that the network trained that is generated by a visit to a website over Tor reveals information consists to the products theorem, the timing and a local adversary to inter which websites were visited by a particular user [14]. The identifying information leaks from the at that is generated by a visit to a website over for reveals information specific to the website through the timing and particular user [14]. The lucinitying miorination reaks from the di-the communication's meta-data, more precisely, from the diinformation specific to the website through the timing and sizes of network packets. By capturing traffic traces between ure communication's meta-uata, more precisely, from the di-rections and sizes of encrypted network packets. As this side sizes of network packets. By capturing traffic traces between users and their Tor entry guard, a network eavesdropper can be readed the meta-data to reveal which website Tor near and users and their Tor entry guard, a network eavesdropper can leverage this mela-data to reveal which website Tor users are detained. The success of each ottopic heavily demands on the rections and sizes of energypicu network packets. As this succer channel information is often unique for a specific website, it leverage this meta-data to reveal which website Tor users are risting. The success of such attacks heavily depends on the particular set of traffic features that are used to construct the channel information is often unique for a specific websile, it can be leveraged to form a unique fingerprint, thus allowing visiting. The success of such attacks heavily depends on the particular set of traffic features that are used to construct the ferromative Tratecille, these features are monucle organized can be reveraged to rorm a unique ingerprint, inus allowing network eavesdroppers to reveal which website was visited 2 particular set of traffic features that are used to construct the ingerprint. Typically, these features are manually engineered and as each any change introduced to the Ter network on ingerprint. Typically, these features are manually engineered and, as such, any change introduced to the Tor network can render these carafully constructed features ineffective Te and based on the traine that it generated. The feasibility of Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks on and, as such, any change introduced to the 10r network can render these carefully constructed features ineffective. In this based on the traffic that it generated. The reasoning of website ringerprinting (Wr) attacks on For was assessed in a series of studies [25], [31], [19], [24], render these carefully constructed features mellecuve. In this paper, we show that an adversary can automate the feature enternation to demonstrate Termine international time enternation. paper, we show that an adversary can automate the feature engineering process, and thus automatically deanonymice we tenfine be emploine our need method based on door location we for was assessed in a series or studies [23], [31], [19], [24], [32]. In the related works, the attack is treated as a classiengineering process, and thus automatically deanonymize. For traffic by applying our novel method based on deep learning. We collect a detect comprised of more than three million network [52]. In the related works, the attack is treated as a classification problem. This problem is solved by, first, manually traffic by applying our novel method based on deep learning. We collect a dataset comprised of more than three million network traves which is the located dataset of web traffic area much for ncauon problem. This problem is sorved by, nrst, manually engineering features of traffic traces and then classifying these \mathbf{v} collect a dataset comprised of more than three million network traces, which is the largest dataset of web traffic ever used for website formermitting and find that the nontermonon onlinear to engineering reatures or trainic traces and men classifying mese features with state-of-practice machine learning algorithms. traces, which is the largest dataset of web traffic ever used for website fingerprinting, and find that the performance achieved by our dame learning energies between the second problem to known methods reatures with state-or-practice machine learning algorithms. Proposed approaches have been shown to achieve a classificawebsite ingerprinting, and find that the performance achieved by our deep learning approaches is comparable to known methods which include vertice recorrely offerte erronning over methods our deep learning approaches is comparable to known memous which include various research efforts spanning over multiple Proposed approaches have been shown to achieve a classifica-tion accuracy of 91-96% correctly recognized websites [30], which include various research efforts spanning over multiple years. The obtained success rate exceeds 96% for a closed world of 100 websites and 0.4% for our biomest closed would or out uon accuracy of 91-90% correctly recognized websites [20], [24], [13] in a set of 100 websites with 100 traces per website. years. The obtained success rate exceeds 96% for a closed world of 100 websites and 94% for our biggest closed world of 900 decome the environment model evaluation, the most nectorman [24], [15] in a set of 100 websites with 100 traces per website. Their works show that finding distinctive features is essential of 100 websites and 94% for our biggest closed world of 900 classes. In our open world evaluation, the most performant from togeneric model is 2% more accurate than the state of \mathbf{O} Their works show that finding distinctive features is essential for accurate recognition of websites. Moreover, this tasks can classes. In our open world evaluation, the most performant deep learning model is 2% more accurate than the state-of-the ort offset. Furthermore we show that the imminist features for accurate recognition of websites. Moreover, unstasks can be costly for the adversary as he has to keep up with changes deep learning model is 2% more accurate than the state-of-the-art attack. Furthermore, we show that the implicit features retermined to be sensed by our approach are for more resilient to the art attack. Furthermore, we show that the implicit features automatically learned by our approach are far more resilient to dynamic changes of web content even time. We conclude that ue cosuy for the auversary as he has to keep up with changes introduced in the network protocol [4], [20], [9]. The WF automatically learned by our approach are far more resilient to dynamic changes of web content over time. We conclude that the ability to entermatically construct the most value of the effective 3 introduced in the network protocol [4], [20], [7], the wr research community thus far has not investigated the success dynamic changes of web content over time. We conclude that the ability to automatically construct the most relevant traffic features and worform accurate traffic recommittee mostee on research community mus rai has not investigated the success of an attacker who automates the feature extraction step for the ability to automatically construct the most relevant traffic features and perform accurate traffic recognition makes our deen learning based annroach an efficient flexible and robust or an anacker who automates the feature extraction step for classification. This is the key problem that we address in this features and perform accurate traffic recognition makes our deep learning based approach an efficient, flexible and robust technique for website fingergrinting .00 An essential step of traditional machine learning is feature on communication of the second process, based on the second process of the second proces of the second process of the second p 08 technique for website fingerprinting. Bouter (Tor) is a communication tool that prothe cugine cung is a manual research out of raw The second secon work.

- Collect Labeled **Network Traces**
- Extract **Features**


to be even more

- Train Classifier (classical/deep)
- Classify Unknown Network Traces

Classical ML vs Deep ML

- Classical ML: you choose features, classifier decides
- Deep ML: classifier chooses the features and class
- Both classifiers: training, testing, accuracy

Output Layer




How is WF Evaluated?

Automated Website Fingerprinting through Deep Learning Vera Rimmer*, Davy Preuveneers^{*}, Marc Juarez[§], Tom Van Goethem^{*} and Wouter Joosen^{*} §imec-COSIC, ESAT, KU Leuven never the origin and destination of a communication at the Email: marc.juarez@esat.kuleuven.be never me ongui and desunation of a communication at me same time. Tor's architecture thus prevents ISPs and local same time. For s arcnitecture titus prevents 1578 and 10ca network observers from identifying the websites users visit. Network observers from identifying the websites users visit. 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
- Main metric is accuracy
- Closed World vs Open World
- Base rate is important!
- Network based WF has >90% accuracy


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
Traffic Moulding Defenses against WF




Source: lakeland.co.uk









Memorygrams



Github



Oracle



Cache-Based WF

Robust Website Fingerprinting Through the Cache Occupancy Channel Anatoly Shusterman Ben-Gurion University of the Negev shustera@post.bgu.ac.il Yarden Haskal Ben-Gurion Univ. of the Negev yardenha@post.bgu.ac.il Yossi Oren Ben-Gurion Univ. of the Negev yos@bgu.ac.il

University of Adelaide lachlan.kang@adelaide.edu.au Prateek Mittal Princeton University pmittal@princeton.edu Yosef Meltser Ben-Gurion Univ. of the Negev yosefmel@post.bgu.ac.il Yuval Yarom University of Adelaide and Data61 yval@cs.adelaide.edu.au

Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack model used to evaluate website fingerprinting attacks assumes an *on-path adversary*, who can observe all traffic traveling between the user's computer and the secure net-

In this work we investigate these attacks under a different attack model, in which the adversary is capable of sending a small amount of malicious JavaScript code to the target work.

user's computer. The malicious code mounts a cache side channel attack, which exploits the effects of contention on the CPU's cache, to identify other websites being browsed. The effectiveness of this attack scenario has never been systematically analyzed, especially in the open-world model which assumes that the user is visiting a mix of both sen-

where we we be the structure attacks in sitive and non-sensitive sites. feasible. Specifically, we use ma-

activity reduces the effectiveness of the attack and completely eliminates it when used in the Tor Browser.

Over the last decades the World Wide Web has grown from 1 Introduction an academic exercise to a communication tool that encompasses all aspects of modern life. Users use the web to acquire information, manage their finances, conduct their so-

cial life, and more. This shift to the so called virtual life has resulted in new challenges to users' privacy. Monitoring the online behavior of users may reveal personal or sensitive information about the users, including information such as

sexual orientation or political beliefs and affiliations. Several tools have been developed to protect the online privacy of users and hide information about the websites they visit [18, 20, 71]. Prime amongst these is the Tor network [20], an overlay network of collaborating servers, called *relays*, that anonymously forward Internet traffic between users and web servers. Tor encrypts the network traffic of all of the users, and transmits it between relays in a way that prevents external observers from identifying the traffic solic users. In addition to the network itself, the Tor that further protects

- Collect Labeled Memorygrams
- Extract Features
- Train Classifier (classical/deep)
- Classify Unknown Memorygrams
- >90% accuracy

Cache-based vs Net-based WF

Cache beats Net	Net beats Cache
Resists net countermeasures	Can be detected by victim
Robust to response caching	Depends on hardware config
Works across NICs	
Lighter attack model	

Demo

Countermeasures

Power Analysis Attacks Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards

Stefan Mangard Elisabeth Oswald Thomas Popp



• Hiding


- Lowering the SNR
- Hiding in Time
- Hiding in Amplitude
- Masking
 - Secret Invariance
 - Separation in Time
 - Separation in Space

Hiding in amplitude


- Idea: run a dummy prime and probe in the background
- What is the effect on WF accuracy?
- What is the effect on performance?

Effect on Accuracy

ML with Cache Activity Masking



Effect on Performance



Conclusions

- Side-channel attacks can attack human secrets, not just cryptographic secrets
- Specifically, cache-based website fingerprinting is feasible and very dangerous to user privacy
- What other secrets can we attack?
- What kind of countermeasures apply here?

Thank you!

- Dataset freely available under CC-BY 4.0 license
- Contains:
 - Thousands of memorygrams in multiple settings
 - Associated network traces
 - Deep learning classifiers in Python

https://orenlab.sise.bgu.ac.il/publications/RobustFingerprinting





